Page **1:**

Habermas begins by introducing the topic of Hannah Arendt's concept of power. He notes that it contrasts with Max Weber's more traditional definition. This sets the stage for a detailed comparison and analysis of the two perspectives. [cite: 1, 2]

**Page 2:**

Habermas explicitly contrasts Arendt's and Weber's definitions of power. He introduces the concept of the "teleological model of action," which underpins Weber's definition. This model emphasizes individual goal-oriented action and the use of power as a means to achieve those goals. [cite: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]

**Page 3:**

The concept of "free agreement" is introduced as a key distinction between Arendt's and Weber's views. Habermas argues that the teleological model doesn't genuinely allow for free agreement, as any consensus reached is merely a means to an end for each individual actor. [cite: 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]

**Page 4:**

Habermas introduces Arendt's alternative model, the "communicative model of action." This model emphasizes the formation of a common will through unconstrained communication. He contrasts this with Parsons' systems-theoretic concept of power, which, like Weber's, focuses on achieving collective goals rather than genuine consensus. [cite: 19, 20, 21, 30, 31, 32]

**Page 5:**

The idea of "reaching agreement as an end in itself" is further developed. Habermas highlights the importance of the "rationality claim immanent in speech," arguing that true consensus arises from a shared commitment to rational discourse and mutual understanding. [cite: 39, 40, 43, 44, 45]

**Page 6:**

Habermas explores the implications of Arendt's concept of power, noting that it is an end in itself, serving to maintain the communicative praxis from which it originates. He also points out the normative dimension of Arendt's concept, raising the question of its scientific utility. [cite: 50, 51, 56, 57]

**Page 7:**

Habermas delves into the theoretical foundations of Arendt's concept, linking it to her renewal of the Aristotelian concept of "praxis." He introduces the concept of the "life-world" as the shared space of communicative action, shaped by human plurality and natality. [cite: 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73]

**Page 8:**

The concept of "unimpaired intersubjectivity" is introduced as a central component of Arendt's theory. Habermas explains how these structures, formed through communicative action, are essential for a "normal" and "worthy" human existence. [cite: 78, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87]

**Page 9:**

Habermas highlights Arendt's central hypothesis: political legitimacy and power are inextricably linked to the preservation of undistorted communication within the public realm. Replacing power with force leads to the decline of political communities. [cite: 90, 91, 92, 93]

**Page 10:**

Habermas explores Arendt's analysis of totalitarian rule, emphasizing the destruction of communicative structures and the isolation of individuals. He points out the unique characteristic of totalitarian regimes to mobilize depoliticized masses, making them complicit in the regime's actions. [cite: 96, 97, 98, 99, 105]

**Page 11:**

Habermas discusses Arendt's critique of privatism in modern societies, arguing that the privatistic lifestyle, coupled with the bureaucratic structures of modern states, creates fertile ground for the rise of totalitarian rule. [cite: 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120]

**Page 12:**

The dangers of privatism are further explored in the context of democratic elitism. Habermas highlights Arendt's concern that the bureaucratization of political participation in modern democracies can lead to the mobilization of the unpolitical masses. [cite: 125, 126, 127]

**Page 13:**

Habermas shifts the focus to Arendt's analysis of revolutionary movements and the establishment of political liberty. He emphasizes the power of common conviction and its ability to challenge illegitimate institutions and coercive state apparatuses. [cite: 130, 131, 132]

**Page 14:**

Habermas examines Arendt's observations on the historical attempts to institutionalize direct democracy. He notes the recurring motif of the "pathos of the new beginning" and the desire to give institutional permanence to the communicative generation of power. [cite: 143, 144, 145, 146, 147]

**Page 15:**

Habermas begins his critique of Arendt's theory, focusing on her rigid dichotomies between the public and private spheres, and between the state and the economy. He argues that these dichotomies, derived from her idealized image of the Greek polis, are not applicable to modern societies. [cite: 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158]

**Page 16:**

Habermas criticizes Arendt's view that the intrusion of social and economic matters into the political realm is inherently destructive. He argues that her narrow conception of politics, focused solely on the "practical," blinds her to the complex interplay between the political, social, and economic spheres in modern societies. [cite: 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172]

**Page 17:**

Habermas challenges Arendt's exclusion of strategic elements from the realm of politics. He argues that strategic action, while distinct from communicative action, is still a form of social interaction and plays a crucial role in the acquisition and maintenance of political power. [cite: 177, 178, 179]

**Page 18:**

The distinction between political power and force is further explored in the context of warfare. Habermas argues that while warfare highlights the contrast between power and force, it should not lead to the complete exclusion of strategic action from the political sphere. [cite: 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191]

**Page 19:**

Habermas emphasizes the growing importance of strategic action in modern societies, particularly with the rise of capitalism and the institutionalization of strategic competition within the political system. [cite: 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203]

**Page 20:**

The discussion of strategic action continues with an analysis of its institutionalization in the modern state. Habermas argues that the competition for political power, while necessary, should not be mistaken for the generation of legitimate power, which arises from unconstrained communication. [cite: 208, 209, 210]

**Page 21:**

Habermas shifts the focus to the employment of legitimate power, emphasizing the role of binding decisions made by those in positions of authority. He points out the limitations of Arendt's action-theoretic framework in analyzing the employment of power within a political system. [cite: 213, 214, 215, 216, 217]

**Page 22:**

Habermas critiques Parsons' systems theory approach to power generation, arguing that it fails to capture the communicative dimension of power emphasized by Arendt. He highlights the importance of unconstrained communication in the production of power, which cannot be simply generated "from above." [cite: 237, 238, 239, 240, 241]

**Page 23:**

Habermas introduces the concept of structural violence, suggesting that it can explain the persistence of political rule even in the absence of widespread consensus. He argues that structural violence can block communications and lead to the formation of illusionary convictions, which can be used to legitimize power. [cite: 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268]

**Page 24:**

The distinction between illusionary and non-illusionary convictions is explored. Habermas criticizes Arendt's sharp distinction between knowledge and opinion, arguing that it prevents her from recognizing the rational discourse as a basis for legitimate power. [cite: 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276]

**Page 25:**

Habermas concludes by discussing Arendt's reliance on the concept of contract and mutual obligation as the foundation of power. He suggests that Arendt's retreat to contract theory reflects her reluctance to fully embrace the implications of her own concept of communicative praxis. [cite: 277, 278, 279, 280]